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should be cleared with the author.The Macroeconomic Implications of Public Sector Deficits
Public Sector deficits have increased substantially during
the last decade both in Western Europe and in other parts
of the world. As can be seen from chart 1 public sector
deficits of Western European OECD countries measured as
percentage of GDP were at a relatively modest level in the
Sixties. The period average in the Sixties was about 0.3
per cent with some years (1960-62 and 1969) even showing
financial surpluses. In the seventies the period average
increased to about 2.3 with a rising trend. In the cyclical
peak of 73 the deficit was already somewhat larger than in
the preceding peak years of the Sixties. The main increase
in the level of public deficits came with the recession of
74/75 when the ratio of the deficit to GDP reached 4.6 per
cent. While the deficits were reduced in 1976/77 to 3 per
cent of GDP they increased again to 3.8 per cent during the
economic upswing at the end of the decade, reflecting a strong
pro-cyclical course of fiscal policies in this period. While
the rising public sector deficits have been criticised on
various grounds (mainly relating to negative supply effects)
they have also been defended by arguing that without the
additional deficit spending there would have been a lower
level of aggregate demand and employment .\
The focus of this paper will be on the macroeconomic demand
effects.of public deficit spending. In part I we present a
short survey of the main developments in the theory of fiscal
demand management. The survey starts from the original Hicks-
Hansen IS-LM mod-el and covers the subsequent extensions of the
analysis that have freen made through the introduction of open
economy considerations, wealth effects, price-wage repercussions,
budget constraints and expectation effects. In part II we
review the empirical estimates of the demand effects of public
deficit spending which have been obtained from various econometric
policy simulations for Germany. Part in contains a discussion
of international policy issues on the conduct of fiscal policy
1 See e.g. German Council of Economic Experts (1978/79, p.145-147)
2 Matthofer (1980, p. 125)Chart 1
Public sector deficits of Western European OECD countries as percentage of GDP
a
I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Calculated as the difference between total government outlays and current receipts of government; a negative sign
indicates a financial surplus.
Source: OECD (1982), tables R8 and R9.- 2 -
including the so-called locomotive approach, the recent trans-
atlantic controversy on U.S. fiscal policy and its implications
for Western Europe, and finally, the domestic and international
implications of strategies that aim at a reduction of public
sector deficits.- 3 -
I. The Theory of Fiscal Demand Management
Deficit_Sgending_in__the_Hicks3Hansen_Model
One of the cornerstones of the Keynesian revolution
was the analytical demonstration that changes in govern-
ment spending or taxation which are financed by correspon-
ding changes in the stock of privately held government
bonds can affect the level of aggregate demand. In the
Hicks-Hansen IS-LM model which soon became a standard
framework of analysis, the "normal" effects of a bond-
financed increase in government spending (represented by
a rightward shift of the IS-curve) are a rise in the rate
of interest and an increase in aggregate nominal demand;
moreover, since the Hicks-Hansen model includes the
assumption of constant nominal wages and a price-elastic
supply of goods - reflecting a situation of'Keynesian un-
employment" (Malinvaud 1978) - the increase in aggregate
spending leads to an expansion of real output. The positive
effect of deficit spending on aggregate demand can be
explained by the fact that the increase in the interest
rate which results from the additional public borrowing
does not only reduce investment demand but also reduces
the demand for money balances. Thus, part of the additional
public spending is brought about by a more intensive use
of existing money balances (reflected in an increase of the
velocity of money) rather than a crowding-out of private
investors .
There are two extreme cases in the IS-LM model in which
deficit spending leads to a full crowding-out of private
investment demand. The first is the case of a perfectly
interest-elastic investment demand (represented by a hori-
zontal IS-curve); the second is the case of a perfectly
inelastic demand for money (represented by a vertical
LM-curve).The effect of a bond-financed increase in deficit spending
on aggregate demand is influenced by the money supply strategy
of the central bank. If the central bank aims at a target
for a wide monetary aggregate like M3 which largely consists
of interest bearing assets, or at a target for the monetary
base where the reserve component includes reserves on interest
bearing assets, the LM curve will be steeper (and the efficiency
of fiscal demand policy be lower) than in the case of a target
for a narrow monetary aggregate like M1 .
1
At this point it may be worth noting that financial inno-
vations such as the payment of variable interest on demand
deposits (which has become a widespread practice in the
United States during the recent years) reduce the interest
elasticity of the demand for M1 and thereby lower the effi-
ciency of fiscal demand management under an M1-oriented stra-
tegy of the central bank.- 5 -
Considerations
The extension of the IS-LM model to the open economy by
Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1968) had major implications
for the efficiency of fiscal demand management. The Fleming-
Mundell analysis showed that international capital mobility
reduces the effect of deficit spending on domestic aggregate
demand . In the extreme case of a very small open economy
with perfect capital mobility and flexible exchange rates
it was shown that bond-financed increases in government spending
have virtually no effect on aggregate demand for domestic goods.
There are different ways to explain why international capital
mobility reduces the efficiency of fiscal demand management. •
An explanation from the monetary perspective runs as follows:
an inflow of capital reduces the effect of deficit spending
on the domestic interest rate; as a result the velocity of money
and, hence, aggregate demand rise less strongly than in the case
of an isolated domestic capital market. From the goods market
perspective the lower efficiency of fiscal demand management
under international capital mobility is reflected by the
worsening of the trade account which goes along with a capital
inflow . In the case of a very small economy where the addi-
tional government spending is financed exclusively by a capital
inflow the worsening of the trade account equals the increase
in public expenditure so that aggregate demand does not respond
at all to the fiscal expansion.
In this context it is worthwhile to note that international
capital mobility substantially changes the way in which bond-
financed government spending "crowds-out" private demand. In
the open economy there are three mechanisms through which crowding-
out may be brought about:
In the absence of capital mobility deficit spending has the
same effect on aggregate demand and interest rates as in the
closed economy. The depreciation of the domestic exchange
rate which results from the fiscal expansion in the absence
of capital mobility fully offsets the income-induced increase
in import demand so that there is no leakage of demand effects
to other countries.- 6 -
crowding-out via the domestic interest rate; this mechanism
becomes less important under international capital mobility
since an integrated international capital market reduces
the effect of deficit spending on the domestic interest rate;
crowding-out via the foreign interest rate; under conditions
of international capital"mobility the increase in the interest
rate which results from domestic deficit spending is trans-
mitted to other countries where it leads to a crowding-out
of foreign investment and, thereby, a reduction in export demand
for domestic investment goods ;
crowding-out via the exchange rate; when capital is mobile
internationally a bond-financed increase in government spending
may lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency which
reduces the demand for domestic tradables; an appreciation
is the more likely to occur the closer is the degree of sub-
stitution between domestic and foreign bonds and the smaller
is the size of the domestic economy relative to that of the
other countries.
1
In the original Fleming-Mundell model which is based on the
assumption of perfect capital mobility there is no distinction
between domestic and foreign interest rates. The negative
impact of the world interest rate on the demand for domestic
goods implicitly includes the negative response of the foreign
demand for domestic investment goods in case of a rising world
interest rate. Once imperfect capital mobility is allowed
for a distinction between domestic and foreign interest rates
is required. The above consideration also suggest that export
functions should include the level of foreign interest rates
as an explanatory variable (Lehment 1982).- 7 -
Wealth effects
The introduction of wealth effects into the IS-LM analysis
showed that deficit spending- may not only affect the position of the
IS-curve but also that of the LM-curve (Christ 1968, Silber 1970).
If government bonds are considered as private net wealth an in-
crease in the stock of privately-held bonds via public deficit
spending tends to raise the private demand for goods (shifting the
IS-curve further to the right) but may also increase the demand
for money balances (shifting the LM-curve to the left).
Whether the efficiency of fiscal demand management is raised
or reduced by the existence of wealth effects depends on the
relative strength with which the demand for goods and the demand
for money react to changes in private wealth. On the basis of
a theoretical analysis it may be possible that the leftward shift
of the LM-curve compensates or even more than compensates
the rightward shift of the IS-curve so that an increase in bond-
financed government spending has no effect or even a negative
effect on aggregate demand .
Friedman (1978) has stressed the importance of the relative
degree of substitution between bonds and capital for the
analysis of wealth effects. In the standard IS-LM model
bonds and capital are treated as perfect substitutes. If the
degree of substitution between capital and bonds is less than
perfect and lower than the degree of substitution between
bonds and money the LM-curve many react to an increase in bond-
financed government spending by shifting to the right rather
than to the left.Pri£e;;Wage_Rep_ercussigns
In the traditional IS-LM analysis a central role was played
by the assumption that wages do not react to an increase
in aggregate demand . This assumption was challenged by
Friedman's (1968) hypothesis of a vertical Jong-run Phillips-
curve, which although first discussed in connection with
monetary policy also had an important implication for the
efficiency of fiscal demand management. The implication is
that even if deficit spending has positive effects on aggregate
nominal demand, its output and employment effect will only
be transitory (see, e.g.}Dornbusch and Fischer 1981, p. 452-54).
In the long-run, when wages have fully caught up to the increase
in aggregate demand, the effect of the fiscal expansion
will fall exclusively on prices, raising the price level in pro-
portion to the increase in aggregate nominal demand, while
output and employment remain unaffected.
Most of the traditional IS-LM analysis also assumed that
an increase in aggregate demand has no effect on prices.
The extension of the analysis to the case of a less than
perfectly elastic supply of goods showed that some part of
the increase in aggregate demand is soaked up by an increase
in prices so that the output effect is reduced; however,
as long as the assumption of unchanged nominal wages is
maintained the output effect remains positive (Blinder and
Solow, 1973, p. 324).- 9 -
bu dge t _ cons traint_and_its_ implication.
The original IS-LM model was constructed for a short-run
analysis. The introduction of the government budget
constraint (Ott and Ott 1965, Christ 1968) directed the
attention towards the longer-run effects of deficit spending.
A central question was whether the initial deficit of a bond-
financed fiscal expansion would be removed over time by an
endogenous increase in tax receipts. The extension of the
IS-LM model to a long-run analysis (Blinder and Solow 1973,
Tobin and Buiter 1976, Brunner and Meltzer. 1976, Dornbusch
1976, Siebke, Knoll and Schmidtberger 1981) showed that the
answer to this question depends on a number of factors in-
cluding the properties of the tax system and the effect of
changes in wealth on the demand for money. There are circum-
stances in which bond-financed deficit spending may result in
a continuous increase of government deficits if it is not
stopped by future discretionary reductions in public spending
or increases in tax rates. In such a case a full account of
the demand effects of a fiscal expansion makes it necessary
to consider also the effects of the future fiscal restriction
which is required in order to prevent an explosive increase
in budget deficits.- 10 -
The_role_o£_exgectations_
The impact which expectations have for the success of economic
policy actions has received increasing attention in recent
years. Several arguments have been advanced in favour of
the hypothesis that the efficiency of fiscal demand management
may be destroyed or at least reduced by the effect which
deficit spending has on the expectations of private market
participants:
additional government investment, e.g. in the housing
sector, tends to lower the expected rate of return on
competing private projects and, hence, tends to reduce
private investment demand; • this case is referred to in
the literature under the name of "direct" or "ultrarational"
crowding-out (Bailey 1971, David and Scadding 1974);
- private market participants may expect an increase in future
taxes in order to service and repay the additional public
debt and react to the expected loss in future disposable
income by a reduction in current spending and an increase
in saving (Barro 1974); in the IS-LM diagram this "Ricardian"
effect is reflected - like the "direct" crowding-out effect -
by a reduction in the rightward shift of the IS curve;
an increase in public sector deficits may lead to additional
economic uncertainty. Ifprivate market participants react
to the additional uncertainty by increasing their demand for
liquid assets-including money - the efficiency of deficit
spending on aggregate demand is reduced through a leftward
shift of the LM curve; moreover, the increase in uncertainty
may also be reflected in a smaller rightward shift of the
IS-curve because of a negative impact of uncertainty on
private investment demand (Keynes, 1936, p. 120, Cebula 1973)
For a graphical and an algebraic analysis of expectation
effects in the IS-LM model see Carlson and Spencer (1974)
and Dieckheuer (1980).!
- 11 -
- the anticipation of the demand and price effects of fiscal
policy reduces the wage and price lag so that the effect
of deficit spending on the level of output and employment
becomes more shortlived (Giersch 1976, p. 54-55).^
It should be noted, however, that expectation effects of
public deficit spending may in some cases also have a posi-
tive impact on aggregate demand as, e.g., in the case of a
public infra-structure project which improves the expected
return on related private investment projects.- 12 -
II. Deficit. Spending and Aggregate Demand: The Results
of Investigations for Germany
Evidence from Large Macroeconometric_Models
In the recent years there have been various attempts to
quantify the effects of government deficit spending
on aggregate demand and output through policy simulation
in the context of large macroeconometric models for
Germany (Krelle et al. 1979, Conrad and Kohnert 1980,
Westphal 1981, DIW 1981, P'ohl 1981, Vesper and Zwiener
1982, Tewes 1982, Deutsche Bundesbank 1982).
One common result of the studies is that an increase in
government spending leads to a higher level of nominal
demand both in the short run and in the longer run. Another
common., result is that an increase in government spending
positively affects real output in the first two years after it
has been initiated.Those of the simulations which cover
a period of more than two years have arrived at mixed re-
sults about the long-run real effects of an increase in
government spending. While Conrad and Kohnert (19 80)
find that the long-run real effect is relatively low but
still positive, the study by the Bundesbank (1982) arrives
at the result that after approximately 2 1/2 years the
initial positive effects on output are followed by an in-
duced d@line in real GNP which completely offsets the
initial gains in output and employment. This result is
attributed largely to the price-wage feedbacks operating in
the model and is consistent with the hypothesis of a verti-
cal long-run Phillips curve.
If one considers the implications of these results for
the crowding-out debate two points should be noted.- 13 -
Bibliothek des Institute
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First, the simulations are based on the implicit or ex-
plicit assumption that an increase in government spending
causes an additional expansion of central bank money (and
other monetary aggregates) . The reason is that the Bundes-
bank is assumed to either directly fix short-run market inter-
est rates or to fix its own lending rates (discount rate,
lombard rate) and, thereby, to dampen the increase in market
interest rates which results from additional government borro-
2
wing . The result, however, that a fiscal cum monetary ex-
pansion leads' to an increase in aggregate nominal demand has
never been a controversial issue of the crowding-out debate.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the assumption of an accomiio-
dating monetary policy reflects the actual behaviour of the
Bundesbank. Central bank money is used since 1973 as an inter-
mediate target for the Bundesbank's policy and the Bundesbank
has never considered an increase in government spending as a
reason to pursue a more expansionary monetary policy . Thus,
1
An exception is the investigation by Krelle et al. (1979)on
the basis of the Bonn-model (Version 8.2) where additional
government spending even causes a slight reduction in the
monetary base and M1. It should be noted, however, that
monetary aggregates do not play an important role in the
underlying model. This is shown by the fact that a simul-
lated 20 per cent reduction of minimum reserves and the re-
sulting increase in the money supply have practically no effect
on interest rates, exchange rates and GNP. The velocity of
money is, thus^regarded as highly unstable and largely inde-
pendent from changes in interest rates - a view which is not
compatible with the results of empirical studies on the velo-
city of money (Langfeldt and Lehment 1980). This objection
applies in a similar way also to the simulations by Conrad and
Kohnert (1980) on the basis of Version 10 of the Bonn-model.
2
In the second case the increase in market interest rates will
lead to an additional demand for central bank money which is
assumed to be accommodated . at least to the
extent, of existing lines of credit opened up by the Bundesbank.
Central bank money is defined as the sum of currency held by
non-banks and bank's minimum reserve held against residents
deposits calculated at constant reserve ratios. Central bank
money targets do not constitute "base control". The Bundesbank
controls central bank money through changes in interest rates
which affect credit expansion, the growth of bank deposits and -
via the induced effects on minimum reserves and currency holdings
central bank money (Bockelmann 1979).- 14 -
at least for an analysis that goes beyond the very short-run
it seems more appropriate to base simulations of a fiscal
expansion on the assumption that the Bundesbank reacts
to an additional increase in the demand for central bank
money by raising its interest rates (or lowering them not
as fast as she would have done otherwise) in order to keep
the expansion of central bank money on its preannounced course.
In this case the demand effect of a fiscal expansion would most
likely be lower than in the simulations which are based on the
assumption of an accommodating monetary policy.
A second point is that the structural macroeconometric models
on which the simulations are based incorporate only a part
of the potential channels for a crowding out of private demand.
Domestic interest rates have a negative effect on
domestic investment demand in all models and in some
models also on the demand for consumer goods; the role
of crowding-out via a rise in domestic interest rates
is, however, strongly reduced by the assumption of an
accommodating monetary policy which completely or largely
neutralises the effect of deficit spending on domestic
interest rates.
Foreign interest rates do not enter into any of the models
as an endogenous variable so that a crowding-out of
foreign demand for domestic products via the effect of
deficit spending on foreign interest rates is not considered.
Exchange-rates are endogenous in some of the models; it is,
however, doubtful whether the effect of a fiscal expansion on
the exchange rate is correctly grasped by the equations;
Dornbusch (1982, p.10) in reviewing the empirical evidence
on exchange rate determination arrives at the conclusion
that "claims for empirically successful exchange-rate equa-
tions are disappearing rapidly This is the case- 15 -
whether a monetary approach is adopted, a Mundell-Fleming-
Frankel model or models that include, in addition, current
account or relative wealth variables".
Wealth effects are considered explicitly only by Westphal
(1981). He finds that the introduction of a wealth variable
reduces the effect of a fiscal expa^ion on demand but only
to a very small extent.
Expectations usually represent one of the major problems
of econometric research (Lucas 1976); expectation-induced
crowding-out via direct substitution effects, the discounting
of future tax payments or risk effects are not accounted for
in any of the simulations.
Long-run effects on the budget are neglected in most of the
.investigations „ Conrad and Kohnert (19J8O, Table A4 and A 9)
arrive at the result that an increase in government spending
reduces the budget deficit already in the first year (and
in all of the following years). In contrast to this result
Tewes (1982) finds that in the first two years (which is the time
horizon of his simulation) budget deficits increase by about
50 p.c. of the rise in government spending.- 16 -
Form Estimates
Dewald and Marchon (1979) have presented a reduced form
estimate of aggregate nominal spending for Germany on the
basis of the St.Louis model.They find that the elasticity
of aggregate nominal demand with respect to changes in
government spending is about 0.05. This value is sub-
stantially lower than the estimates from the structural
macroeconometric models for Germany. A general critique
that has been advanced against reduced form estimates is
that the fiscal policy coefficient may underestimate the
actual fiscal impact in cases where government spending sy-
stematically neutralises the effect of exogenous shocks
(Blinder and Goldfeld 1972). At least in the German case,
however, it appears doubtful whether such a systematic fiscal
policy has been pursued in the pas.t.
Neumann (1981) uses a small macroeconomic model with rational
expectations to test for the effects of unexpected changes
in the money supply and government spending. He finds that
an unexpected change in public expenditure on consumption
and investment goods has no significant effect on private
sector output (being defined as real GNP minus salaries of
public employees at constant prices). Neumann explicitly
mentions the empirical difficulties in separating the un-
expected changes from the expected changes. Since the si-
mulations are not run also for the overall changes in govern-
ment spending the results of this study are not directly
comparable to those of the other investigati°
ns•- 17 -
The OECD (1982) has constructed a small macro model for
the purpose of estimating the effects of an increase in
government spending both under an "accommodating" and under
a"non-accommodating" monetary policy. The real sector of
the model essentially follows that used for the OECD inter-
link model; the monetary sector covers the supply and demand
for money (M3 in the case for Germany) using parameter estimates
from Bowghton (1979).
In the OECD Study an "accommodating" monetary policy is taken
to imply that the central bank fixes the interest rate. A
"non-accommodating" monetary policy is taken to imply that the cen-
tral bank ..fixes the money supply. The study arrives at the
result that the effect of fiscal policy on income under a non-
accommodating monetary policy is 3 to 9 times lower than in
the case of monetary accommodation but still positive for all
the countries under consideration . For Germany the assumption
that the Bundesbank controls M3 under a "non-accommodating"
strategy comes close to the actual policy since deviations in
the movement of M3 ~ and the movement of central
bank money are usual.y relatively small. In order to check
to which extent the results are changed if it is assumed that a
"non-accommodating" monetary policy involves holding the supply
of central bank money constant I have estimated a demand
function for central bank money of a similar structure as the
M3 function used in the OECD simulations. The regression which
is based on annual data for the period 1961 - 79 has yielded
the following result :
For Germany the nominal income multipliers are 3.11 in the case
of an accommodating monetary policy and 0.67 in the case of a non-
accommodating monetary policy. The substantial difference be-
tween the two figures implies that changes in the money supply have
a powerful effect on aggregate demand.
2 The underlying nominal adjustment hypothesis performs better
in the estimations than the real adjustment hypothesis which
implies a lag term of the form In (CBM_1/P_1); as has been
shown by Goldfeld (1976) the nominal adjustment hypothesis
assumes that nominal money balances are adjusted only gradually
to price changes whereas the real adjustment hypothesis assumes
an immediate proportional reaction of nominal balances to price
changes. The introduction of real public debt into the equation
did not lead to a significant improvement of the estimate; this
means that we have found no support for the hypothesis that
changes in the stock of government bonds cause a shift of the
LM curve.- 1
In (CBM/P) -0.79 .+ 0.45 In GNP
r - 0.08 In R
1 + 0.60 In (CBM^/P)
(4.64) (5.68) (4.39) (8.23)
R
2 = 0.998 S.E. = 0.010 D.W. = 2.03
with CBM = central bank money
P = GNP deflator
GNP
r = real" GNP
R = long-term government bond yield;
t-values are shown in the parentheses .
The estimate implies a long-run income elasticity of 1.1 and
a long-term interest elasticity of 0.20. If the estimated function
for central bank money is substituted for the M3 equation in the
OECD model the income multiplier for the "non-accommodation" case
is reduced from 0.67 to about 0.40 . The multiplier which is , thus,
derived from the OECD model under the assumption of non-accommo-
dation in respect to the expansion of central bank money is about
twice as high as the multiplier in the St. Louis model
2, but it
is also about eight times lower than the multiplier for the"accommo-
u
dation case in the OECD-model under the assumption of flexible ex-
change rates and about three times lower than the multiplier of 1.2
which has been derived in the OECD-model under the assumption of
an accommodating monetary policy which fixes not only . interest
This result is derived by substituting the parameter values
of the CBM equation for the parameters of the M3 equation in
the formula for the income multiplier which is given in table H
of the OECD study. The lower value of the multiplier is largely
due to the fact that the interest elasticity in the M3 equation
which has been estimated by Boughton is 0.40 and, hence, above the
estimate for the interest elasticity in the CBM equation. The
, relatively high interest elasticity in the M3 equation is
largely due to the underlying real adjustment hypothesis in Boughton's
study. I have run a regression on the demand for M3 analogous to
the CBM regression (i.e. incorporating the nominal adjustment hypo-
thesis) and found that in this case the long-run interest elasti-
city is about 0.20 and, hence, similar to the result for the CBM
estimate. Moreover, I found that the nominal adjustment hypo-
thesis performs better than the real adjustment hypothesis also in
the case of the M
3equation.
 lt should be noted that the small
OECD-model also covers only part of the crowding-out mechanisms which
have been discussed in the literature so that the multiplier may
actually still be lower than the estimates from this model.
2The share of public consumption and investment is about 25 per cent
of GNP in Germany so that the elasticity of 0.05 which has been
found by Dewald and Marchon implies a multiplier of about 0.20.- 19 -
rates but also the exchange rate
The experience of the Bretton-Woods system casts substantial
doubts on the ability of a central bank to simultaneously con-
trol both interest rates and exchange rates. Economic theory
suggests that in order to keep both variables constant in case
of a domestic fiscal expansion the home central bank must pursue
(1) an expansionary open-market policy to stabilise the interest
rate and (2) sell foreign currency against domestic currency
in order to prevent the depreciation which would otherwise result
(Lehment 1980, Ch. III). In order to be successful such a policy
requires that the domestic central bank has a sufficient stock
of foreign currency and that the increase in the foreign money
supply which results from the intervention in the exchange market
is accepted by the monetary authorities of the other countries
concerned. If a central bank does not sell foreign money but
foreign securities (which is the general rule since central banks
usually do not hold foreign currency) the effect on the exchange-
rate will be smaller and require an even larger amount of foreign
assets. Moreoever, the sale of foreign securities will tend to
raise the domestic interest rate and, hence, have an adverse effect
on the interest-rate target. If domestic and foreign securities
are imperfect substitutes the effect will, however, not be fully
offset - provided again that the foreign monetary authorities do
not react despite the fact that the sale of foreign securities
tends to; raise foreign interest rates and the velocity of money
abroad. With imperfect substitutability it can, however, no
longer be assumed that an "accommodating" monetary policy implies
constant interest rates, since the operations by the central bank
that are be required to keep the exchange-rate constant cause a
divergence between foreign and domestic interest rates so that
at last one of the two rates has to change.- 20 -
III. International Economic Policy Issues
The Locomotive Approach
The issue of an international coordination of economic
policy including the course of national fiscal policies
emerged soon after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system in 1973. The discussions intensified in 1976/77
when it became evident that the recovery from the 74/75
recession was faltering. Moreover, the different re-
actions to the oil-price hike of 1973 had led to a di-
vision of industrial countries into so-called "strong"
countries including the United States, Germany and Japan
which had managed to keep their inflation rates on a
relatively low level and so-called "weak" countries like
the United Kingdom, Italy and - to a lesser degree - France
which had reacted to the removal of the exchange-rate
constraint by pursuing strongly expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies and in 1976 found themselves in a position
with high inflation rates, a strong devaluation of their cur-
rencies vis-a"-vis those of the "strong" countries and high
current account deficits.
To the background of this international economic setting
a "locomotive" approach was suggested by various economists
and international economic organisations .
1.Cooper (1976, p. 47), Tripartite Group (1976, McCracken et
al. (1977, pp. 30-31, pp. 236-37); OECD (1976), BIS (1976,
p.7), EC (1977, p.4).- 21 -
The core of the locomotive strategy was that "strong" countries
should stimulate their internal demand and thereby help to
pull the "weaker" countries out. of the prevailing stagnation .
The main elements of this demand-oriented version of the loco-
motive apprach, which was supported especially by the OECD,
may be outlined as follows (Gebert and Scheide 1980, Whitman
1978)
2.
First, a main reason for the slowdown of the recovery was seen
in an unsufficient level of aggregate nominal demand .
Second, it was argued that the "weak" countries had no room to
pursue an expansionary policy on their own since this would lead
to a "vicious circle" of a further (real) depreciation of their
currencies, additional increases in import prices,and higher
wage claims. For the "strong" countries, it was argued, a vicious




The locomotive approach was not formulated in a unified theoretical
framework and has been subject to substantial differences in inter-
pretation.
2.
Apart from the demand-oriented interpretation there was also a
supply-oriented interpretation stressing the importance of struc-
tural adjustment and innovation in advanced countries as an in-
strument to improve economic conditions in "weaker" countries in-
cluding the LDC's (Giersch 1978).
3
The alternative view that the stagnation had its main source on
the supply side and especially in wage increases which exceeded
the (adequate) increase in aggregate nominal demand received com-
paratively little attention in the international economic policy
discussion.
4
For a criticial assessment of the vicious circle hypothesis see
Haberler (1977). Moreover, the suggestion to stimulate demand
in weaker countries through an expansionary policy in the strong
countries stood in apparent contradiction to the recommendation
that restrictive demand policies should be pursued by the weaker
countries in order to reduce inflation (OECD 1976).- 22 -
Third, in the proposals for an expansion of demand large
weight was given to fiscal deficit spending. The OECD
(1977, p. 10) explicitly encouraged governments in "strong"
countries to increase their budget deficits and to remove
political, legal and administrative barriers against a further
increase in budget deficits. There may be several reasons
why fiscal rather than monetary measures were regarded as
the main instrument of the locomotive strategy.
One consideration is the result of a theoretical analysis of
economic policy effects in the context of a Fleming-Mundell model
with flexible exchange rates and international capital mobility.
In this model a monetary expansion in one country has a negative
effect on income in other countries whereas a non-accommodated
fiscal expansion has a positive effect both on domestic and foreign
income and, hence, a comparative advantage as an instrument of
a locomotive strategy (Dornbusch and Krugman 1976). A non-accommo-
dated fiscal expansion was, however, considered to be insufficient
under quantitative aspects since much of the •impact would be
offset by the induced increase in interest rates (Solomon 1978) .
However, an accommodated fiscal policy will be less efficient as
a locomotive for other countries since the additional monetary
expansion will strenghten the demand effect for the domestic country
but weaken the demand effect that falls on other countries. If
the monetary policy completely offsets all interest-rate effects
of the fiscal expansion there will be no leakage of demand effects
to other countries.
A monetary-fiscal expansion in one country - while having no or
only small direct effects on the demand for foreign goods - may,
however, indirectly contribute to an expansion in foreign demand
since it tends to have a positive effect on the external value
of foreign currencies and, hence, removes the exchange-rate con-
straint to an expansionary demand policy in other countries. In
The results of the OECD study (1982) which show relatively
low multipliers for non-accommodated fiscal expansion support
this view.- 23 -
fact this second aspect soon became a major point in inter-
national policy discussions of 1977/78 where the original loco-
motive strategy was replaced by the suggestion for a concerted
expansion in the OECD-era (the so-called convoy-strategy) ac-
cording to which "impetus would come from expansion not only
by the stronger-currency countries but also from the intermediate
countries taking advantage of their increased "elbow-room"(OECD
1978, p. XIII).
If the role of" .strong" countries, however, is reduced to a re-
moval of the exchange-rate constraint for "weaker" countries a
fiscal expansion has no comparative advantage over a purely
monetary expansion which - in contrast to a fiscal stimulus -
has a clear-cut effect on the exchange rate in standard open-
economy macromodels.
A second and very important reason for the weight which was put
on fiscal measures must be seen in the use of macroeconometric
models which did not allow for a separate analysis of money
supply effects. In the simulations with the OECD interlink model
which provided the empirical basis for a large part of the dis-
cussion on the locomotive and convoy strategies the only instru-
ment of demand management considered was an accommodated fiscal
expansion (OECD 1979) \
A third reason for the dominating position of fiscal measures
in the locomotive/convoy discussions (and a reason that became
specially important for the transformation of the suggestions into
actual policy decisions) has to be seen in the institution of
economic summit meetings; of heads of state and government. Since
in several of the leading industrial countries monetary policy
is not in the hands of the government resolutions or decisions
at summit meetings which aim at stimulating demand (as at the Bonn
Summit of 1978) tend to show an inherent bias towards fiscal
measures.
For a critical review of OECD interlink model and the policy
simulations based on this model see Gebert and Scheide (1980,
ch. 4). It may be of interest that for Germany a fiscal multi-
plier of 1.5 has been assumed in the interlink simulation; this
value is about four times higher than the value which we have
derived for a "non-accommodated" fiscal expansion in the OECu
(1982) model.- 24 -
A critical re-assessment of the locomotive and convoy strategies
will have to focus especially on two points.
First, the underlying view that an expansion of demand would not
create bottlenecks problems and would have only a rather small
effect on prices is not supported by the experience of the years
1978-80. Bottlenecks appeared already in 1979, e.g. in the con-
struction sector in Germany. Consumer price inflation in Western
European OECD countries which had run at 9.9. p.c. in 1978 in-
creased to 15.6 in 1980. The increase in hourly wage rates rose
from 12.2 in 1978 to 14.7 in 1980 in Western European OECD-countries
exhibiting a substantial domestic element in the reacceleration of
inflation.
The second point concerns the weight that was put on government
deficit spending as an instrument of demand expansion and the
neglect of monetary policy :• which - if considered at all - was
given only the auxiliary function of accommodating the fiscal stimu-
lus . If we look at evidence that has been presented up to now
on the relative efficiency of monetary and fiscal policy we do
not find support for the view that fiscal expansion deserves priority
when considering measures that affect aggregate demand. As is
shown, e.g., by the OECD (1982) study the effect of an "accommodated"
fiscal expansion for the countries listed is between 3 to 9 times
longer than in the case of "non-accommodation" (p. 45), indicating
the dominating role of money supply changes in the context of a
monetary-fiscal expansion.
"Concern about possible supply constraints may be more relevant
from the point of view of medium-term problems than from those of
the next 12 to 18 months. The fear of bottlenecks, even for
fairly narrowly-defined sectors, seems, at the moment, unjusti-
fied" (OECD 1978, p. X).
"Although there would probably be some resulting upward pressure
on prices it could be kept small, particularly if the fiscal stimu-
lus consists of measures calculated to reduce cost and price pressu-
res in the first place"(OECD 1978 p.X).
In its discussion of possible different ways of implementing
the convoy strategy the OECD (1978, p. XIV) considered various
different forms of fiscal stimuli; monetary policy is not even
mentioned.- 25 -
At this point one may speculate about the way in which a stronger
consideration of monetary factors in the international policy
discussions of the years 1976-78 might have affected economic
events. First, it is likely that with less weight being put
on fiscal expansion budget deficits would have not increased as
strongly as they did. Second, the strong monetary expansion in
several "locomotive" countries including Germany which could be
observed since the autumn 1977 would have implied a more cautious
view on the need for a further monetary-fiscal expansion and
might have contributed to avoiding the economic overheating of
1979/80 (which in turn can be regarded as a major factor for the
sharpness of the subsequent recession).- 26 -
The 1982 Transatlantic Controversy on US-Budget Deficits
The plans of the U.S.-government to cut taxes substantially
without proportionate reductions in government spending led
to a controversy between policymakers in the US and Europe.
On the European side there was concern that the increase in
U.S.-budget deficits would raise interest rates not only
in the United States but also in Western Europe and, thereby,
contribute to a lenghtening of the worldwide recession..
The underlying view that a country should pursue a less ex-
pansionary fiscal policy in order to stimulate the economy of
other countries stands in obvious contrast to the locomotive
approach and, hence, invites a more detailed discussion.
An analysis in the context of a Fleming-Mundell model shows that
a bond-financed increase in U.S. government spending has a negative
effect on aggregate demand for European products via the induced
increase in world interest rates; at the same time, however, there
are positive demand effects for Europe which result from the
increase in US income and - possibly - from a real appreciation
of the U.S.-currency. On balance the positive demand effects
are stronger (although their quantitative impact may be rather
small under a non-accommodating policy). Thtse considerations
suggest that a fiscal restriction in the U.S. will not contribute
2
directly to an economic recovery in Europe .
It should be stressed that concern about lar^e U.S.-budget defi-
cits was expressed also by economists and political representa-
tives within the United States. The tax increase^ which were
adopted in summer 1982 in order to reduce part of the revenue
shortfalls of the cut in income taxes and the subsequent decline
in U.S.-interest rates seem to have largely settled the trans-
atlantic dispute about U.S.-budget deficits-- at least for the moment
2
The reduction in interest rates, however, tends to affect the com-
position of spending and - by favouring investment relative to con-
sumption - may have a positive effect on long-term growth.-li-
lt has also been suggested that U.S.-fiscal policy exerts
a negative impact on world demand by causing U.S.-monetary
policy to be more restrictive than it would otherwise be
(Bergsten 1982). If we consider a combination of an ex-
pansionary fiscal policy and a restrictive monetary policy which
fully neutralises the effect of deficit spending on U.S.-income
in the Fleming-Mundell model we find that such a policy mix
does not have a negative but rather a positive effect on aggre-
gate demand for European goods, as long as flexible exchange
rates are assumed; the reason is that the negative demand
effect of the U.S. monetary policy via the induced increase in
interest rates is more than offset by the positive demand effect
that results from the induced real depreciation of European
currencies.
In order to arrive at a negative effect on aggregate demand for
European goods one has to make the assumption that the fiscal
expansion in the U.S. (possibly combined with a U.S. monetary
restriction) leads to a tighter monetary policy (and/or a
fiscal policy) in European countries).
A tightening of European monetary policies may occur if (1) the
US-fiscal expansion raises the external value of the US-dollar and
(2) the European monetary authorities wish to prevent or at
least dampen the depreciation of their currencies in order to coun-
teract imported inflation. There is, however, a substantial degree
of uncertainty both about the effect of deficit spending on the ex-
change-rate and about the reaction of central banks to exchange-
market pressure. The uncertainty about the exchange-rate effect of
an increase in public sector deficits is illustrated by the ob-
servation that the depreciation of European currencies in the
recent years has to some part be attributed to the negative confidence
1
Bergsten (1982) assumes that the negative demand effect of
the induced monetary restriction is even stronger than the
positive demand effect of the fiscal expansion; a reason for
this assumption is not given.- 28 -
effect of the increase in European public sector deficits,
while the increase in US-budget deficits has at least for some
time been taken as a reason for the strength of the US-dollar
in the exchange market . There are questionmarks also in
respect to the reaction of central banks to exchange rate
changes. If we look at monetary policy in Germany (which because
of the important role of the German currency in the EMS is
of interest also for the other EMS members) we find that despite
the substantial increase in US-budget deficits and despite a
further appreciation of the dollar vis-a"-vis the D-Mark since
the beginning of this year the increase in central bank money in
1982 is close to the upper limit of the target range of 4 - 7
per cent, and it may be doubtful whether the monetary expansion
would have been significantly larger had the dollar been less
strong in the exchange market.
One may therefore conclude that the positive effect of reduced
U.S. fiscal deficits for Western Europe should be seen in the
longer-run allocative effects of lower interest rates rather
than in a short-run stimulating effect on aggregate demand.
The observation that the recent increase in US-taxes and the
resulting reduction in the interest differential between the
United States and European countries has gone along with a
further appreciation of the dollar makes the argument appear doubtful- 29 -
?9.
m?:> tic _and _ Inte rnat ional _ Iinglica t ions_o £ _Strategies
to Reduce Public Sector Deficits
Several arguments have been advanced in favour of a reduction
of the present structural budget deficits.
First, as a result of the growth of public sector deficits in
the last decade government interest payments as a ratio of
GNP have increased substantially in Western Europe and have
contributed to the overall government sector expansion (Cassel
1982, Table 5). A reduction in public borrowing would con-
tribute to slow down or even reverse public sector expansion
which frequently is regarded as a main impediment to economic
growth. Second, a reduction in public sector deficits tends
to reduce real interest rates and, thus, has a positive effect
on investment and long-term growth prospects; moreover,, lower
interest rates contribute to a reduction of public sector interest
payments and to a solution of the debt service problems which
presently are regarded as a major threat to the stability of the
international financial system. Third, a reduction of struc-
tural budget deficits has a positive effect on long-term.economic
planning in the private sector by removing the uncertainty which
may otherwise exist in respect to the long-term financing of
government expenditures. Fourth, large current account deficits
which often serve as an excuse for the introduction of trade re-
strictions usually reflect large government deficits (Emerson 1982,
Graph 5). A reduction of budget deficits would reduce the scope
for concern, about the current account and, thus, help to prevent
and remove protectionist policies .
"The current-account deficit of a country is the sum of the private
financial deficit (excess of investment over savings) and the pub-
lic deficit. If the current-account deficit increases this may be
because the private deficit has risen - which is not a matter for
public-policy concern - or because the public deficit has risen -
jwhich may indeed be a matter for concern. But the balance-of-pay-
Iments figures in themselves will not tell one whether there is a
problem. One must got directly to the public-sector (including cen-
tral-bank) figures, so making the balance-of-payments figures re-
dundant" (Corden, 1977, p.51). Once current account problems are
identified to be, in fact, government budget problems there is little
reason to resort to trade restriction which is a most inappropriate
instrument for the removal of excessive budget deficits.- 30 -
The major argument against a reduction in budget deficits con-
cerns the negative aggregate demand effect that is expected to
result from a fiscal restriction . The weight of this argu-
ment depends on several factors including the size of the de-
ficit cut, the quantitative impact of a deficit cut on aggregate
spending, and the ability of the central bank to neutralise a
negative fiscal impact on aggregate spending through a compen-
satory adjustment of the money supply. As an example for the
effects of a deficit cut on nominal demand and its implication
for monetary policy we may consider the case of Germany. The
German "Council of Economic Experts (1981) has suggested to reduce
the-structural component of the budget deficit( which according
to its estimates amounts to about 2 per cent of GNP)over a period
of 4 years. With a fiscal multiplier of 0.4 derived from the
OECD (1982) study under the assumption of a given expansion of
central bank money an annual cut of public sector deficits by 0.5
per cent of GNP reduces aggregate nominal spending by 0.2 per cent
1
The argument that a reduction in present deficits would be sub-
optimal from the perspective of intertemporal burden-sharing
has played no role in the recent policy discussion. Negative
incentive effects may be brought forward as an argument against
a reduction of public sector deficits through tax increases but
can hardly serve as an argument against a reduction of deficits
through a cut in government consumption and transfers. For a
discussion of the pros and cons of various possible measures to
reduce public sector deficits see Lehment (1981).
2 the
Ifmultiplier of 0.20 which has been found in the context of the
St. Louis model (Dewald and Mar'choni 979) is used, the effect on
nominal GNP amounts to only 0.1 per cent. Moreoever, it should be
noted that the multipliers are derived for a change in fiscal ex-
penditure on investment and consumption. To the extent that the
deficit cut takes the form of a reduction in transfer payments or
an increase in taxes standard analysis suggests- that the fiscal
multiplier and the effect on aggregate demand should even be lower- 31 -
Since the elasticity of nominal GNP to changes in central
bank money is close to 1 a neutralisation of the negative
fiscal demand effect would require an additional increase
in central bank money by 0.2 per cent. Time-lags of mo-
netary policy have to be considered but they should not pro-
vide too large a problem since the effect of a fiscal re-
striction on aggregate demand also tends.to operate with some
time lag (especially if the deficit cuts are brought about
by a cut in transfer payments or an increase in taxes) and
since the fiscal measures can be announced in advance so that
corrective monetary measures can be taken at an early stage .
A fiscal restriction combined with a monetary expansion that
offsets the negative fiscal impact on domestic aggregate demand
tends to have a negative demand effect for other countries
to the extent that it leads to a reduction of foreign interest
rates and, hence, a lower velocity of money. In the case under
consideration this reduction in velocity should, however, be
relatively small and could be offset by a somewhat more ex-
pansionary monetary policy in the other countries. With re-
spect to the other EMS countries such a monetary response may
at least to some extent be. induced automatically since a German
policy package of fiscal restriction and monetary expansion
which is neutral in respect.to domestic.nominal GNP should
reduce the upward pressure on the external value of the D-Mark
in the EMS .
In the context of the present policy of the Bundesbank a
reduction in public sector deficits could be included among
the factors which the Bundesbank regards as justifying a
monetary expansion in the upper part of the announced target
range.
The argument is analogous to the consideration that a cor-
responding policy mix in the Uni.ted States would reduce the
upward pressure on the external value of the dollar.- 32 -
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Deutsche Kurzfassung
Wie in anderen Landern so stieg auch in der Bundesrepublik
das strukturelle staatliche Haushaltsdefizit in den sieb-
ziger Jahren kraftig an. Ein Hauptgrund £iir diese Entwicklung
ist darin zu sehen, daft die Regierung versuchte, die gesamt-
wirtschaftliche Aktivitat durch kreditfinanzierte Konjunktur-
programme anzuregen. Stiitzen konnte sie sich bei diesen Ver-
suchen auf die Ergebnisse verschiedener Simulationsanalysen •
auf der Basis umfangreicher gesamtwirtschaftlicher Mo.delle,
aus denen hervorgeht, daft derartige Programme zu mehr Pro-
duktion und Beschaftigung fiihren. Gegen diese Simulationen
lassen sich jedoch verschiedene Vorbehalte geltend machen..
Zwei Einwande haben dabei besonderes Gewicht.
Erstens werden die Mechanismen, iiber die ein staatliches
Deficit Spending private Nachfrage verdrangen kann, in den
zugrundeliegenden Modellen nur unvollstandig erfaftt. Dies
gilt insbesondere fur die Erwartungseffekte zusatzlicher kre-
ditfinanzierter Staatsausgaben, aber auch fur die Wechselkurs-,
Vermogens-, Preis- und Lohneffekte. Die Deutsche Bundesbank
hat in einer neueren okonometrischen Untersuchung insbesondere
die Bedeutung der Preis-Lohn-Effekte hervorgehoben. Nach
dieser Untersuchung hat ein staatliches Deficit Spending - selbst
wenn es gelingt, dadurch die monetare Gesamtnachfrage nach-
haltig zu erhohen - auf die reale wirtschaftliche Aktivitat
nur voriibergehend einen positiven Einfluft, da die Zunahme der
offentlichen Ausgaben nach einiger Zeit einen zusatzlichen
Anstieg von Preisen und Lohnen hervorruft, der den anfang-
lichen Produktions- und Beschaftigungszuwachs am Ende vollig
aufzehrt.- 38 -
Zweitens wird bei den Simulationen durchweg angenommen, daft
die Bundesbank die Wirkung der zusatzlichen staatlichen Kredit-
aufnahme auf das Zinsniveau neutralisiert oder zumindest dampft,
indem sie zusatzliches Geld zur Verfugung stellt. Ein Ver-
driingen privater Nachfrage liber hohere Zinsen wird somit bereits
durch die Annahmen, die den- Simulationen zugrundeliegen, vollstandig
oder zumindest teilweise ausgeschlossen. Zudem steht die An-
nahme uber das Verhalten der Notenbank im Widerspruch zu der
tatsachlich von der Bundesbank betriebenen Politik. Die Bundes-
bank hat wiederholt deutlich gemacht, daft ein zusatzliches
staatliches Deficit Spending fur sie kein Grund ist, die Geld-
menge starker zunehmen zu lassen, als sie es sonst getan hatte.
Dies gilt auch umgekehrt. Ergreift die Regierung Maftnahmen
zum Abbau des staatlichen Defizits, so bedeutet dies nicht,
daft die Geldmengenzunahme geringer ausfallt, als es sonst
der Fall ware. Simulationen, bei denen implizit unterstellt
wird, daft geringere Staatsausgaben auch eine knappere Geld-
versorgung bedeuten, tendieren somit dazu, die Nachfrage-
wirkung eines staatlichen Defizitabbaus zu iiberschatzen. Wie
erheblich die sich daraus ergebende Fehlschatzung sein kann,
zeigt eine neuere Studie der OECD. Danach fallt der Nachfrage-
effekt kreditfinanzierter Staatsausgaben in den grofteren west-
lichen Industriestaaten urn das drei- bis neunfache geringer
aus, wenn die Annahme, daft die Notenbank den Zins konstant
halt, durch die Annahme ersetzt wird, daft die Notenbank den
gegebenen Geldmengenkurs beibehalt.
In einer Simulation auf der Basis dieses OECD-Models wird ver-
sucht, den mittelfristigen Nachfrageeffekt des vom Sachver-
standigenrat fur die Bundesrepublik markierten Konsolidierungs-
pfads zu quantifizieren, und zwar unter der Annahme, daft die
Geldpolitik auf potentialorientiertem Kurs bleibt (die Konsoli-
dierung also nicht zu einer restriktiveren Entwicklung der
Zentralbankgeldmenge fuhrt). Das Ergebnis der Simulation ist,- 39 -
daft der vom Sachverstandigenrat vorgeschlagene Abbau des struk-
turellen Haushaltsdefizits urn etwa 9 Mrd. DM je Jahr (0,5 vH
des nominalen Bruttosozialprodukts) nur minimale restriktive
Wirkungen auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage hat. Der
geringe restriktive Effekt (von maximal 0,2 vH des Sozialprodukts)
kommt im wesentlichen dadurch zustande, daft der Zinsriickgang, der
eintritt, nicht nur die private Guternachfrage anregt, sondern
auch zu einer erhohten Kassenhaltung fiihrt, die sich in einer
mehr als nur voriibergehende Verminderung der Umlaufsgeschwindig-
keit des Geldes niederschlagt. Der geringe Riickgang der Umlaufs-
geschwindigkeit konnte gegebenenfalls dadurch ausgeglichen werden,
daft die Bundesbank im gleichen Ausmaft - also maximal 0,2 vH -
mehr Zentralbankgeld zur Verftigung stellt.